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I. 
‘The Irish are out in force’: it was a rainy summer day on the fields of the Somme, 
and they were very young, in their early teens, in fact.
i
 However, this was not 1916, but 2016, 
when the centenary of one of the bloodiest battles in history attracted an international crowd, 
including large contingents of school children from the Republic. In contrast to the 50
th
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anniversary, which, in 1966, had been a ‘Unionist’ commemoration – claimed by the 
Northern Irish loyalists as their own, while the survivors of the Southern veterans kept their 
heads down and suppressed this part of their past – in 2016 the conflict was widely construed 
as an inclusive experience, which saw men and women giving their lives ‘for Ireland’ even 
when fighting ‘for King and Empire’. A generation ago this would have shocked traditional 
nationalists, who regarded the Great War as an ‘English’ one, in contrast to the Easter Rising 
and the subsequent War of Independence. However, European integration and the Peace 
Process gradually brought about a different mind-set. Among historians, it was the late Keith 
Jeffery who spearheaded the revision of our perception of Ireland’s standing in the war.ii This 
reassessment was further developed in 2008, with John Horne’s editing Our War, a volume 
jointly published by RTÉ (the Irish broadcasting company) and the Royal Irish Academy, in 
which ten of the leading historians of the period – including Keith Jeffery, Paul Bew, David 
Fitzpatrick and Catriona Pennell – presented Ireland as a protagonist, rather than merely a 
victim of British imperialism.
iii
 By 2016 this new understanding had largely reshaped both 
government and public perceptions, with ‘the emergence of a more tolerant and flexible sense 
of Irish identity.’iv This has been confirmed by the largely consensual nature of the war 
centenary commemorations. While Dublin took the initiative, Northern Ireland’s Sinn Féin 
leaders were ready to follow suit with the then deputy first minister of Northern Ireland, 
Martin McGuinness, visiting the battlefield of the Western Front to honour the memory of the 
Irish dead, and the Speaker of the Belfast Assembly, Mitchel McLaughlin and his party 
colleague, Elisha McCallion, the Mayor of Derry and Strabane, laying wreaths at the local 
war memorials.  
What they did was not simply consistent with a new political strategy, but also 
reflected grass-root support for a new appraisal of what the conflict meant for people and 
communities ‘on the ground’, as commemoration by-passed national government and was 
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appropriated at the local level. The First World War was not longer a ‘British’ war, nor even 
an ‘Irish’ one in any simple sense of the word. Instead, it was now also a war which had been 
fought by Galway, South Dublin or any other county and city.
v
 This shift from national 
structures to local initiative seems to have affected even the ecclesiastical liturgy, as the 
Church of Ireland issued A Commemoration of the Battle of the Somme for Local Use, with 
prayers, Bible readings, etc., for community members wishing to conduct their own DIY 
services. 
The books reviewed here offer a fascinating exploration of the Irish contribution to 
the war effort. One of them – Jeffery – adopts a global perspective with a strong comparative 
dimension. However, all convey a clear image of the profound difference between the Ireland 
of 1914 – un-partitioned, militarist, imperial, warlike – and the one that commemorated the 
war a century later, with its commitment to peace, multilateralism, the EU and the UN. This 
is also a kind of comparative, trans-temporal, approach. 
 
II. 
During the first six or seven months of 1914 the Irish were absorbed with internal 
issues which appeared existential to many of them – such as the demand for parliamentary 
devolution and Ulster’s right to oppose it by force, if necessary. Europe was on the brink of 
the greatest war since 1815, but many Nationalists and Unionists looked at the continent 
primarily as the place from which they could outsource weapons to fight their own civil war. 
However, even gun-runners such as Sir Roger Casement were not ‘insular’, quite the 
opposite, while intellectuals such as Tom Kettle, James Connolly and Arthur Griffith were 
deeply interested in conceptualising Ireland’s future within a European historical and  
cultural framework – including the ‘Hungarian’ idea of a dual monarchy.vi They were 
affected by the same passions and problems which moved politics and society elsewhere. In 
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particular, in Ireland the campaign to secure self-government had coincided with the 
extension of the franchise, the shift of power from the landed elite to ‘the people’ and land 
reform. Like radicals in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, Irish nationalists had frequently 
expressed criticism not only of British rule in Ireland, but of the whole imperial project, 
linking it to oppression at home.
vii
 In 1899-1902 the Second Boer War was particularly 
controversial, and resulted in some of the more advanced nationalists organising an ‘Irish 
Brigade’, which fought on the side of the Boers on the Veld.viii However, the war marked also 
the apex of pre-World War I Irish involvement in the British Army. Irish troops accounted 
for a substantial proportion of the South African expeditionary force, which was under the 
overall control of Lord Roberts, himself proud of his family connection with Co. Waterford. 
At the end of the war, as the regiments returned to Ireland, people came out in large numbers 
to cheer them: these included many of those who had voted for pro-Boer Nationalist MPs at 
the 1900 election.
ix
  
Part of the explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the military had long 
been an established aspect of popular culture and operated in a sphere that was at least 
mentally separated from that of politics. Both army and navy were major sources of 
employment, not only because Irishmen from all social classes had traditionally flocked to 
the colours, but also because of the local economic importance of military bases. Each of 
them required a support network involving a wide range of manufacturers, merchants, 
shopkeepers, artisans, clergymen and publicans. All of this stimulated the local economy and 
provided a much needed cash injection for provincial garrison towns such as Fermoy and 
Athlone, and helps to explain, as Hughes argues (p.6), why in pre-1914 Ireland relations 
between civil society and the army ‘were … the same as those in other parts of the United 
Kingdom with attitudes ranging from cordiality to frustration or resentment.’  
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Thus, while there were sectarian incidents and outburst of agrarian violence, these 
were localised and could be easily contained. Consequently, Ireland was a desirable home 
posting for Irish regiments, and was not necessarily associated with unrest. The latter was 
nevertheless a concern. The army was regularly engaged in responding to ‘outrages’ 
associated with the land agitation, quelling sectarian riots and – less frequently – containing 
industrial conflict. Of the three, controlling the land agitation was the easiest task. By 
contrast, policing crowds in urban settings was far more complex and politically dangerous: 
perhaps for this reason during the 1913 Dublin lock-out the army was reluctant to deploy 
soldiers against the workers on strike.
x
 The challenge of sectarian disturbances escalated with 
the organisation of the exclusively Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which was set 
up to resist – if necessary by force – the implementation of the 1912 Home Rule Bill. The 
country seemed to be heading for civil war in the spring of 1914, when the officers of a 
cavalry brigade in the Curragh army base threatened to resign their commissions if the 
government ordered them to dragoon Ulster into submission. The issue was very complex 
and involved a populist backlash against parliamentary democracy.
xi
 One important 
dimension to bear in mind is that the ‘mutineers’ were predominantly Irish and upper-class 
and felt that their primary loyalty went to a certain idea of Ireland, rather than the British 
government. So did the 120 army reserve officers who helped to organise and train the UVF 
itself.xii  
Meanwhile, the explosive potential of the crisis was further increased by the 
Nationalists organising their own pro-Home Rule volunteer army importing weapons from 
abroad, just as the Ulster Unionists had done. One of the rare serious incidents between the 
army and civilians took place in Dublin in July 1914, when a contingent of the King’s Own 
Scottish Borderers, deployed to stop a delivery of German guns to the Irish Volunteers, 
having failed to do so, opened fire on an unarmed crowd, killing four people, including the 
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mother of a British soldier. The Bachelor Walk Massacre (as the shooting became known) 
was a panic response to an urban riot, but the army found itself in the difficult position of 
having to act as peacekeepers between apparently irreconcilable factions.  
However, all changed utterly on 4 August 1914. Faced by the German threat, 
Unionists and Nationalists seemed to forget their animosities and develop an inclusive Irish 
patriotism.
xiii
 Over the next four years, some 210,000 Irishmen joined the colours. Of these, 
according to Richardson, who revises previous estimates by David Fitzpatrick, nearly 63,000 
were from Ulster and over 145,000 from the South. Even more remarkable is that Irishmen 
‘continued [to join the forces] long after the brutally long lists of casualties became common 
in the newspapers after the battles of 1914 and 1915, so they were well aware of what they 
were letting themselves in for’ (p.7). Only a minority of these were former Volunteers, 
including some 35,000 UVF and nearly 40,000 Irish Volunteers. The rest of the Irish 
contingent consisted of both reservists who were called up and of new recruits, motivated by 
different ideas and considerations – ranging from a desire to escape poverty at home to 
patriotism, spirit of adventure and peer pressure. It is a different question whether this shows 
a substantial level of popular support for the war effort. For example, as a proportion of the 
eligible population, rural Ireland lagged well behind comparable areas in England and 
Scotland, not exceeding a maximum of 1.9% of the eligible male population (while across the 
channel equally agricultural areas such as Cornwall and Devon yielded 7.7% and 12.7%  
respectively).
xiv
 However, other figures tell a different story: industrial areas in Ulster, 
Dublin, Wicklow and Kildare produced a similar percentage to industrial areas in Yorkshire, 
Northumberland and Durham.
xv
  Irish recruitment went well in 1915, and, after stagnating in 
the middle years of the war, it rose again in August to November 1918, when there was 
concern that the Allies were losing the war. Whatever sense we may wish to make of these 
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trends and figures, it is not clear that there was any direct correlation between recruitment 
and domestic politics.
xvi
 
Hughes’ discussion of the formation of the three Irish divisions is fascinating for it 
illustrates the increasing politicization of the army. The first to be raised was the 10
th
, which 
was completely mixed (‘all the political and religious creeds and none’, p.24). Raising the 
Ulster Division (the 36
th
) was also straightforward, partly because the UVF, on which the 
division relied, had already been structured on the model of the Territorial Army. By contrast, 
the 16
th
 Division – whose organisers had a strong nationalist agenda – proved more difficult 
to raise. John Redmond campaigned for it to be given a distinctively ‘national’ military 
identity, and Sir Laurence Parsons, Divisional Commander, wished to have a high-quality 
unit entirely officered by Irishmen.
xvii
 Not only was this combination of military and political 
requirements difficult to satisfy, but also the nationalist desire to be granted a distinctly Irish 
national military identity found little sympathy with the Secretary of State for War, Lord 
Kitchener (who was himself Irish, though a Unionist, like so many other high ranking 
officers in the Imperial army).
xviii
 
Hughes offers a captivating introduction to the military history of the Irish war. 
Fighting Irish is meticulously researched and engaging, full of anecdotes that bring many 
aspects of the military side of the story to life. For example, we learn that it was an Irish 
soldier who fired the first shot on 22 August 1914, and an Irish officer who drew the first 
blood, when he led a squadron of the Royal Irish Dragoon Guards in a sabre charge against 
German cavalry. Four years later the fighting spirit of the Irish was still in evidence when, in 
November 1918 it was an Irish unit which fired the last shots in anger. Throughout the book 
Hughes provides ample evidence that the army continued to operate, even after 1916, with 
high morale and a relentless commitment to military standards. However, the subject would 
have deserved a more elaborate analysis. One problem with Hughes’ approach is that he 
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relies heavily on one type of primary source, the battalion War Diaries. These are accounts of 
where units where deployed and their record in engagements. Other sources – for example, 
the letters and personal diaries of both soldiers, chaplains and officers, the memoirs of 
generals and commanders – are largely neglected. The result is that Fighting Irish is often 
one-dimensional and dominated by official narratives of heroic gestures. Another problem is 
that the author does not pay sufficient attention to the social and cultural potential of the 
topic. In particular, there is no engagement with the way the militarisation of a generation 
affected Irish ideas of masculinity, an important dimension of the war, as Jane McGaughey 
has shown in her work on Ulster.
xix 
Likewise, Hughes neglects the wider question of the 
relationship between army and society, such as  how the numerical expansion  of the forces 
affected the officer class or attitudes to the Union and the Empire, recently examined by 
Loughlin Sweeney.
xx
 
 
III. 
Granted that the army was an integral part of popular culture, it is nevertheless 
remarkable that a country of such a nationalist and democratic tradition did not give rise to 
any anti-war agitation similar to those elsewhere in Europe at the time, including Spain and 
Italy. In the latter, as Fulvio Cammarano has shown, the demand for the country to remain 
neutral mobilised a large cross section of society, resulting in the country being bitterly 
divided in May 1915, when the Italian government decided to enter the war.
xxi
 By contrast, in 
the late summer 1914, Ireland was supporting mobilisation while disaffection was limited to 
a small minority of the nationalist volunteers. Moreover, as Niamh Gallagher has shown, 
even the Easter Rising and its aftermath had limited impact on the ‘home front’, where 
commitment to the Ally cause helped to sustain the morale and loyalty of the troops. Sinn 
Fein’s victories in by-elections and eventual success in the 1918 general election must be 
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placed alongside the substantial and continuous displays of popular support for the soldiers, a 
phenomenon that Gallagher explains by disassociating the war effort from the political future 
of the Union, and linking it to the wider cause of the Allies.
xxii
 The parallels with popular 
attitudes in 1899-1902 (see p.00, above), are evident. 
In any case, April 1916 the outbreak of the revolution in Dublin itself was repressed 
by Irish troops. In fact, the first unit to engage the rebels was the 3
rd
 (Reserve) Battalion of 
the Royal Irish Regiment, who fought its way from the South Circular Road to Sackville 
Street (now O’Connell Street) and the GPO. It was men from this regiment who took down 
the flag of the ‘Irish Republic’ after the GPO garrison surrendered. These details are little 
known and their significance has never been studied before: for, though the Rising has 
inspired a huge number of publications, almost all of them examine the event exclusively 
from the point of view of the revolutionaries. Richardson takes a bold step by giving a voice 
to ‘the other side’. He has much to write about. In fact, during the first days of the rebellion 
in Dublin there were more Irishmen fighting under the Union flag than in the ranks of the 
revolutionaries. Making a systematic use of previously unpublished personal accounts, 
diaries and letters by soldiers and officers of the many Irish units deployed to fight the 
Rising, Richardson stresses that Irishmen in the army ‘were ordinary men the same as the 
rebels against whom they found themselves fighting’ (p.xi).  
This reminds us of a feature that all revolutions – however ‘glorious’ – share: though 
their supporters perceive them as struggles for political or social liberation fro foreign 
oppression, they are also civil wars. 1916 is no exception, as Iris Murdoch argued in The Red 
and the Green, published one year before the 50
th
 anniversary of the Rising. At that time, her 
view fell predominantly on deaf ears. Yet, of all people, the then serving Taoiseach, Sean 
Lemass knew out of personal experience that her account of families divided by the Rising 
was not purely fictional: he was a veteran of the GPO, but had two cousins, Herbert and 
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Edwin Lemass, who during the Rising were serving as officers in Irish regiments on the 
Western Front (one was killed in action, the other returned briefly, before the IRA forced him 
to leave again; he became a judge in British North Africa). In April 1916 Irish soldiers 
fighting on the Liffey were fully aware of the fratricidal nature of the Rising. Two defected to 
the rebels. At least one officer declined to fight other Irishmen and was transferred (Captain 
George McEnroy, later a high-scoring air ace). By contrast, others felt ‘betrayed’ and 
‘stabbed in the back’ by the republicans and became very aggressive. When discipline broke 
down it was because of Irish military summarily ‘executing’ innocent people, whom they 
believed to be rebels (the most infamous case concerned the deranged Corkman Captain 
Bowen-Colthurst, who murdered four men: the pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, two Irish 
Unionist newspaper editors and a youth who happened to abuse the army in his presence).  
However, most soldiers fought professionally and bravely. Neither class nor religion 
provide much of a clue for understanding their behaviour in fighting the Rising. Catholic 
soldiers from the slums and students on the Officers Training Corps (OTC, including one 
Italian, Demetrio Sarsfield Salazar, the son of the Italian Consul) fought shoulder-to-shoulder 
with Southern Protestants and UVF veterans. Richardson’s chapter on Trinity College is 
revealing of the improvised and chaotic nature of the events surrounding the Rising.
xxiii
 
Contrary to what the College authorities feared, the republicans did not attack Trinity, though 
it held a strategic position in the midst of the city and contained a depot of arms and 
ammunitions which would have been valuable to the insurgents. Defenceless at the beginning 
of Rising, the College saw a motley group of academics, students, porters and stray soldiers 
manning its gates and ramparts until reinforcements arrived on the Wednesday. Meanwhile, a 
group of third-year students, a majority of whom were women, stubbornly insisted on sitting 
an exam on Tuesday 25 April. The role of women in the revolution has now become a major 
aspect of the literature on the Rising, and it is good to see that there is a parallel move to their 
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contribution to the Unionist side.
xxiv
 Again, the Rising brought out a full range of emotions 
from both the politically engaged to those who made up their mind only in response to an 
altogether unexpected crisis. 
All of this remains a contested and difficult area.
xxv
 The centenary of the Easter 
Rising has inspired the publication of a number of path-breaking new works on the factors 
and the mentalities behind the revolution.
xxvi
 However, the analysis of the revolution and that 
of the Irish involvement in the First World War have not been sufficiently integrated.
xxvii
 This 
is one of the reasons why Keith Jeffery’s book – which examines the Rising in the context of 
‘global’ 1916 – is so interesting. His superbly researched, gripping analysis sheds new light 
on a pivotal year in the war and offers an inclusive history of the many theatres where 
fighting took place in that year. It starts with Gallipoli, followed by chapters on the Isonzo, 
Jutland, the Eastern Front, Asia, Africa, the Somme, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans 
the USA and Russia. The Easter Rising is covered in Chapter 4, which is entitled ‘Ypres on 
the Liffey’. As Jeffery notes, ‘[r]ather than seeing the Rising as a uniquely Irish event, sui 
generis and only peripherally part of the wider conflagration, it can only be properly 
understood in the context of the Great War, which provided both the moment … and the 
mode … for its planning and execution’ (pp.103-104). The factors that provided the Dublin 
revolutionaries with their opportunity affected also rebellions and uprisings elsewhere, in a 
world that consisted largely of multi-national empires comparable to the British Empire. 
Already in 1914-15 there had been an Afrikaner rebellion in South Africa (‘a warm weather’ 
version of the Easter Rising, as historian Bill Nasson has put it), followed by the Ottoman 
massacre of the Armenians – in itself motivated by fear of a nationalist rebellion. While there 
is no evidence that the Armenians would have revolted, the Arabs and Bedouin in the 
southern provinces of the empire were actually up in arms against their Ottoman overlords 
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from the summer of 1916, with the help of T.E.Lawrence (himself of Anglo-Irish 
extraction)
xxviii
.  
Muslim nomads also rebelled in Central Asia (Uzbekistan), this time against the 
Russian Empire. ‘[L]ocal religious leaders proclaimed a holy war not only to stop … 
conscription [in the Tsarist army] but also seeking independence from Russia, with aid (if 
possible) from Afghanistan and Germany’ (p.185). In all cases the pattern was similar, with 
revolts affecting ‘territor[ies] with a fairly relaxed pre-war relationship to a greater power … 
which, with the onset of war, in order to secure the territory or to extract the resources for the 
war effort endeavoured to exert greater control than before. This, in turn, could stimulate 
opposition in the subject territory. A pattern … of challenge and response might be 
established which could easily escalate into violent conflict’ (p.232). As the war went on, this 
revolutionary ferment spread from the periphery to the metropole, with the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution being ‘just one … of the violent and opportunistic responses which occurred 
nearly everywhere to the challenges and demands of the wider conflict’ (p.363).  
In Ireland in 1916 the situation was apparently more stable than in the regions 
mentioned above. In fact, the country had in some ways profited from the war, which 
stimulated external demand on both farming and manufacturing, while the government 
improved the old-age pension and other social benefits, thus contributing to supporting 
domestic demand. Extreme poverty remained the lot of the unskilled worker in the inner 
cities, but in the countryside the reforms of 1882-1903 had dealt with the issue of land hunger 
– probably the single most revolutionary question elsewhere in wartime Europe – so that, 
while in Russia and Italy agitators demanded the end of large estates, in Ireland ‘recruiters in 
1915 could … appeal to farmers to defend what they had already secured.’xxix And when 
Roger Casement tried in vain to recruit an ‘Irish Brigade’ among prisoners in German camps. 
As he despondently noted in his diary, ‘I very soon saw from the manner of the men that all 
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hope for an Irish Brigade from such a contemptible crew as these must be entirely 
abandoned. Some of them insulted me … [and] were full of ill will to Germany and in many 
cases “more English than the English themselves”’.xxx 
Apart from the causalities at the front, the main drawback of the war in Ireland was 
stopping the traditional social safety valve: because of restrictions on emigration, the latter 
dropped by 90%, resulting in the rapid build up of frustration and anxiety among young men 
and women who in previous and later periods would have have been heading for Liverpool 
and New York. This was compounded by the return from Britain of Irishmen eager to avoid 
conscription (introduced there in January 1916), including the future IRA leader Michael 
Collins. The threat of conscription being extended to Ireland soon became a major cause of 
disaffection. Yet, as already noted, the situation was certainly not revolutionary, and what 
changed it ‘utterly’ – in W.B.Yeats’ words – was not the Rising, but the government’s harsh 
repression of the insurgents and internment of suspected sympathisers.  
 
IV. 
By the time the war ended, the mood in Ireland was mixed. On the one hand, Sinn 
Féin’s victory in the 1918 general election indicated a massive shift of opinion away from 
Home Rule and towards demands for de facto independence. On the other, the studies 
reviewed here show that for the returning British army veterans there was widespread 
respect. Harry Clarke’s War is all about the way this was expressed in one particular artefact, 
mediated primarily through the artistic genius of the man who illustrated Ireland’s Memorial 
Records (1919). Commissioned by General John French – then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland – 
this eight-volume work listed the names of the Irishmen who lost their lives in the First 
World War. While other memorials of this kind were limited to one city (as in the case of the 
King’s Book of Heroes deposited in York Minster), the Memorial Records was unique 
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because it listed the military casualties of a whole nation – 49,000 in all, as it was believed at 
the time. Harry Clarke’s contribution consisted of illustrative marginalia and decorative 
borders inspired by medieval illuminated manuscripts.   
Marguerite Helmers has written an insightful analysis of the Memorials and the 
contexts in which they were produced, and Irish Academic Press must be congratulated on 
producing an exquisitely illustrated and beautifully presented volume. The book reproduces 
many of the original illustrations and its very layout, from the frontispiece onwards, is 
inspired by Clarke’s artistry. As Helmers notes (p.25), ‘[t]his book is designed to tell the 
story of how and why Ireland’s Memorial Records were published, how they were conceived 
from the beginning as part of a physical national memorial, and how Harry Clarke infused the 
decorative borders with his own distinctive vision.’ Though he was a Catholic, in his 
decorative strategy he adopted also Protestant themes, to make his work truly ‘Irish’ and 
inclusive. Influences behind the project included William Orpen (Clarke’s teacher and the 
Irish painter of the British army and), Sean Keating (another disciple of Orpen’s and future 
artist of the IRA and the Irish Free State), Edwin Lutyens (the ‘architect of the empire’, his 
name famously associated with the planning of New Delhi), and many others. Both Clarke 
and Keating, like their art-school contemporary Wilhelmina Geddes, were Modernists, but 
were also heavily influenced by the Arts and Crafts Movement: indeed, Clarke designed the 
cover for the catalogue of the 1917 5
th
 Exhibition of the Arts and Crafts Society of Ireland.
xxxi
 
However, in his exploration and representation of the human figure he was also influenced by 
the development of the then novel artistic genre, the cinema, and in particular by Charlie 
Chaplin. The latter’s emphasis on the pliability of the body and what were – in his 
performance – almost its bodily extensions (his cane and hat) are mirrored in Clarke’s 
representation of soldiers, rifles, helmets and caps. In this way 
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Harry Clarke creates his own visual narrative of war that encircles the 49,435 names 
of the dead. Influenced by lantern-slide entertainment and the cinema, he is able to 
piece together a bold story of combined military effort and singular sacrifice. The 
effect is to see the names as actors within the great landscapes and ongoing tragedies 
of war. To locate a name on a page is also to refer to the margins, where readers can 
visualise what the soldiers may have experienced in battle. In other words, the images 
are not purely decorative. Harry Clarke astutely creates a graphic narrative of war and 
its aftermath that emotionally affects the reader. (p.127) 
 
With their ecumenical imagery, the Irish Memorials embodied the last magic moment of Irish 
unity, when unionist and nationalist leaders worked together to create a joint memorial for the 
country’s dead. The mood changed very rapidly between the end of the year and the winter of 
1919. Indeed, when the Irish Memorials were published, they already looked like ‘an artefact 
from a distant age’, and failed to become part of the wider remembrance of the war because 
the new, ascendant forces in Ireland – Sinn Féin – refused to be in any way associated with 
what they regarded as the ‘English’ war, and claimed instead the memory of the Irish war of 
independence, starting with the Easter Rising.  
This created an awkward situation for the returning veterans. The debate about their 
experience has resulted in historians reaching divergent conclusions – some arguing with 
Peter Hart that such returnees were targeted by IRA violence and often killed or forced to 
emigrate, others, like John Borgonovo, concluding that there was no antagonism between the 
veterans and the IRA.
xxxii
 One interesting feature of the debate about the returning soldiers is 
uncertainty about their numbers: we are not sure about how many died, and even less about 
how many came back. Government figures released in 1920 listed over 100,000 servicemen 
discharged in Ireland, but the British Legion’s figures were much higher: about 158,000. The 
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Irish Free State (IFS) 1927 report concluded that there were about 150,000, a huge number in 
proportion to the population of the 26 Counties, then amounting to 1,506,889. William 
Redmond, son of the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, argued that altogether – when 
families were included – altogether there were about half a million Irish people with direct 
army connections. The uncertainty reflects the difficulty of agreeing on who should be listed 
as ‘Irish’ serviceman, the effect of partition with its creation of ‘two Irelands’ and the level of 
emigration after 1921. Even before then, so many Britons served in Irish regiments and so 
many Irishmen served in non-Irish units (including British and Imperial battalions) and 
various other specialised branches of the armed forces, such as the Royal Engineers, and in 
the Navy, that it has proved difficult to settle on some agreed figure. Paul Taylor endorses the 
1920 British government estimates and argues that the number must have been around 
100,000.  
Politically, the veterans did not represent a homogenous group: before the war, most 
of those from Southern Ireland would have been supporters of constitutional nationalism, but 
later some of them joined advanced nationalism, or even the IRA, while others, after the 
disbanding of the army, served with the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Auxiliaries. 
Inevitably, from 1919 onwards the IRA targeted veterans who operated with the security 
forces, and many of them were killed in uniform. By contrast, the number of those who were 
killed as civilians (cases in which on could claim there was a deliberate IRA strategy of 
targeting servicemen qua servicemen) is rather low and curiously similar to the number of 
former servicemen who served in the IRA: in each instance, about 100.  
In general, the level of hostility, or lack thereof, shown towards returning soldiers 
varied regionally and between town and countryside (with the latter providing the larger 
number of incidents). Sectarian motivation was not absent, though Protestants were not 
targeted primarily for their religion, but for a variety of related reasons. These included 
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retaliation for Orange attacks on the Catholic community in the North and class antagonism 
to landowners or large farmers. Religion was, however, a factor, marking out some farmers 
or loyalists from the rest, and explaining why Protestants accounted for a disproportionate 
number of the loyalists killed or persecuted in the early 1920s: as a solicitor wrote about a 
client who applied for compensation after he had been beaten up and his crops destroyed in 
1922, ‘a Protestant in Southern Ireland remains more or less in anxiety, because only a 
Protestant will admit themselves [sic] to be loyalist.’ (cit., p.56).xxxiii In most cases, army 
service was at best a contributory factor, but the victims were attacked for something they did 
after being disbanded, such as spying or joining the security forces.  
It is also striking that, despite claims that army service resulted in persecution, in 
1919-21 the number of Southern Irishmen enlisting in the British army remained high, with 
Dublin recruiting more than Belfast, and with ‘[r]ecruitment rates in the south for 17-year 
olds … twice the pre-war rate’ (p.88). Pension and health benefits – including the 
establishment of special hospitals – provided by the British state for its veterans may have 
been part of the incentive for those who enlisted from the IFS, where such services were long 
to remain a luxury.  
Meanwhile, those Southern-Irish veterans who were fit and ready to serve also 
benefited from the IFS’s build up of the National Army: the latter rapidly expanded during 
the civil war, and by 1923 was nearly 60,000 strong, a number twice that of the British army 
in Ireland before 1914. About 20% of the officers and 50% of the rank-and-file were British 
army veterans, whose professionalism was much in demand in times of trouble. Meanwhile, 
former British officers – both Catholic and Protestant – entered the Dail, were appointed to 
the Senate and remained over-represented in the higher echelons of the the judiciary and 
professions.  
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Taylor’s evidence about returning ex-servicemen not being systematically targeted is 
compelling, and is also consistent with the data emerging from other studies about the nature 
of violence between 1919-23. This does not mean that there were no individual or local cases 
of sectarian attacks against Protestant or Catholic loyalists. However, the ex-servicemen were 
too many and too well organised for the IRA to take them on systematically without risking a 
backlash, one which could well have undermined their own campaign. For the same reasons, 
the annual Remembrance Day ceremonies were undisturbed and remained imposing events 
throughout the 1920s – more imposing, in fact, than the commemoration of the Easter Rising 
(whose importance increased from the mid-1930s). Taylor concludes that ‘War service 
brought no privilege from the state or community, but nor did it result in discrimination. 
Following the creation of the Free State there is little to indicate that ex-servicemen were 
marginalised either through the state apparatus or in the local community’ (p.245).  
 
Two final considerations emerge from this survey. The first is that, despite the 
damaging effects of government repression, 1916 was less of a turning point than 1914 (when 
the two rival Volunteer armies had aimed their guns away from each other and against a new-
found common enemy overseas), or 1918 (when at the general election the Irish 
Parliamentary party was almost completely wiped out and Sinn Féin won most seats in the 
Twenty-Six Counties). The second is that 1919, with the beginning of guerrilla warfare, was 
crucial in destabilising the country, and again mainly because of the way the government 
responded to the insurgents. It was as if the lessons that the army had learned when policing 
Ireland in the nineteenth century – that overwhelming force was essential and should be 
accompanied by minimal violence – were forgotten. The irony is that the old link between 
army and the people was rescinded at the very moment when the former represented a larger 
cross-section of society that ever before. Yet, the overall picture that emerges from these 
 19 
studies is that of a complex society, within which all players – including the veterans, the 
British government and the IRA – were more pragmatic and realistic than they have been 
given credit for. The rapid termination of both the Anglo-Irish and the Civil War, and the 
comparatively smooth return to democratic law and order from 1922-3 would otherwise be 
inexplicable.  
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